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ABSTRACT
AD HOC NETWORK SECURITY AND MODELING
WITH STOCHASTIC PETRI NETS
by
Congzhe Zhang
Advances in wireless technology and portable computing along with demands for high
user mobility have provided a major promotion toward the development of ad hoc
networks. These networks feature dynamic topology, self-organization, limited
bandwidth and battery power of a node. Unlike the existing commercial wireless systems
and fixed infrastructure networks, they do not rely on specialized routers for path
discovery and traffic routing. Security is an important issue in such networks. Typically,
mobile nodes are significantly more susceptible to physical attacks than their wired
counterparts.
This research intends to investigate the ad hoc network routing security by
proposing a performance enhanced Secure ad hoc On-demand Routing protocol (SOR).
Specifically, it presents a method to embed "Security Level" into ad hoc on-demand
routing protocols using node-disjoint multipath, and to use "maximum hopcount" to
restrict the number of routing packets in a specific area. The proposed scheme enables the
use of security as a marked factor to improve the relevance of the routes discovered by ad
hoc routing protocols. It provides customizable security to the flow of routing protocol
messages. In general, SOR offers an alternative way to implement security in on-demand
routing protocols.
Ad hoc network is too complex to allow analytical study for explicit performance
expressions. This research presents a Stochastic Petri net-based approach to modeling and
analysis of mobile ad hoc network. This work illustrates how this model is built as a
scalable model and used to exploit the characteristics of the networks. The proposed
scheme is a powerful analytical model that can be used to derive network performance
much more easily than a simulation-based approach. Furthermore, the proposed model is
extended to study the performance of ad hoc network security by adding multipath
selection and security measurement parameters. This research gives a quantificational
measurement to analyze the performance of a modified SPN model under the effect of
multipath and attack of a hypothetical compromised node.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
In the last few years, there was a surge of interest in mobile ad hoc networks. The readers
might have already been familiar with present Internet vision of mobile wireless
networks, such as the cellular networks and wireless Local Area Networks (LANs), in
which wireless nodes on the edge of the network cloud are typically connected and
supported by a single wireless hop to the fixed, wired infrastructure. An ad hoc network
expands this vision. Basically, an ad hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile nodes
dynamically forming a network without the use of any existing network infrastructure or
centralized administration. It can be formed, merged or partitioned into separate
networks, without necessarily relying on a fixed infrastructure to manage their operation.
Hence, there is no fixed infrastructure such as base stations in a cellular network. Each
node is capable of moving independently and functioning as a router that discovers and
maintains routes and forwards packets to other nodes. The topology of interconnections
may be quite dynamic. The rapidly deployable, self-organizing nature is the primary
factor that differentiates ad hoc network from the commercial cellular networks.
In contrast to traditional wire line or wireless network, the ad hoc network
technology is still at its early stage. Much research efforts are being made to address the
issues that primarily differentiate it from its infrastructure-oriented cousin. Typical
differences and operational characteristics for ad hoc networks include distributed
operation, dynamic network topology, fluctuating link capacity, and low-power devices.
1
2Moreover, Quality of Service (QoS), routing, security, mobility, and scalability issues are
also major concerns of ad hoc networks and areas requiring in depth research.
Communications among nodes in an ad hoc network come with the support from
routing protocols. Routing protocol security is an important issue in ad hoc networks.
After a route is successfully found, the information to be sent over it must be protected
against malicious attacks. Since they use the same wireless transmission medium, both
data and control messages need to be well protected. So far many protocols have been
proposed and their performance has been well researched. But the security issues and
concerns have not been addressed in depth. In general, there are two sources of threats:
external and internal attacks. Typically, an attacker can eavesdrop routing information
and inject erroneous routing information, replay old routing information, or distort
routing information. An attacker can successfully partition a network or introduce
excessive traffic load into the network by causing retransmission and inefficient routing.
More severe kind of threat comes from compromised nodes within the internal network.
A compromised node can broadcast incorrect routing information to other nodes.
Detection of such nodes through routing information is difficult in an ad hoc network
because of its dynamically changing topology: an invalid piece of routing information
can be generated by a compromised node, or because of the result of topology changes. It
is difficult to distinguish between them. On the other hand, false routing information
generated by compromised nodes can be considered the same as the outdated
information. As long as there are sufficiently many correct nodes, the routing protocol
should be able to find new routes that pass by these compromised nodes.
3Ad hoc network is too complex to allow analytical study for explicit performance
expressions. One of the widely used approaches is simulation methods. However, there
are two main drawbacks to using simulation: first, it may be time consuming to execute
the necessary simulations. Imaging in a highly variable scenario, with number of nodes
ranging from tens to thousands, node mobility varying from zero to tens of m/s, the
simulation time of most current systems will increase dramatically to an unacceptable
level. Second, it may be difficult to achieve results that are precise enough. In order to get
a reliable value, one has to run simulation tens of iterations with different seed values of a
random generator.
Due to the advantage in quick construction and numerical analysis of Petri nets, it
has been used for the network performance analysis. Yet ad hoc network has not been
explored because of its specific characteristics different from other networks. To present
an approach for the modeling and analysis of large-scale ad hoc network systems using
Petri nets, there are two requirements in advance. First, a model should be detailed
enough to describe some important network characteristics that have a significant impact
on performance. Second, it should be simple enough to be scalable and analyzable.
1.2 Objectives
This research intends to enhance the ad hoc network security and investigate the overall
network security performance using Petri net approaches. The specific objects are:
1) To investigate the "Security Level" concept to enhance the ad hoc network
security by using a multi-path scheme.
42) Based on an ad hoc on-demand routing protocol and "Security Level" concept, to
propose a performance enhanced routing protocol embedding a "maximum
hopcount" factor to restrict the number of routing packets for a particular purpose.
3) To use Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) to analyze the data transmission and develop a
SPN model for network performance analysis as a function of various parameters.
4) To investigate the ad hoc network security using a Petri net approach, and find a
better way to describe the characteristics of security.
1.3 Organization
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 1 gives the motivation and objectives of
the research work. Chapter 2 makes the literature review of the current research issues
and existing methods on the related research subjects. Chapter 3 proposes a performance
enhanced secure ad hoc on-demand routing protocol addressing on the ad hoc network
security. Chapter 4 develops a stochastic Petri net model for ad hoc network and makes
the network performance analysis based on this model. Chapter 5 proposes a method
embedding security and multi-path aspects into the Petri net model. Finally, Chapter 6
presents the conclusions and some future research directions.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Ad Hoc Network
Advances in wireless technology and portable computing along with demands for further
user mobility have promoted the development of ad hoc networks. Such networks are
characterized by dynamic topology due to node mobility, and self-organizing. Their
nodes have only limited bandwidth and limited battery power. Unlike the existing
commercial wireless systems and fixed infrastructure networks, ad hoc networks reply on
no specialized routers for path discovery and traffic routing. In such a network, each
mobile node operates not only as a host but also as a router, sending and forwarding
packets to other mobile nodes in the network that may not be within its direct wireless
transmission range. Every node in a network complies with an ad hoc routing protocol
that allows it to discover "multi-hop" paths, which means a packet from a source node to
a destination node can go through several nodes throughout the network.
Ad hoc networks have largely evolved from the packet radio network program of
the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) [Jubin and Tornow,
1987]. They intend to play an important role in military and commercial settings where
mobile access to a wired network is either ineffective or impossible. In the early 1990s, a
series of new developments signaled a new phase in ad hoc networking. The Department
of Defense funded the Near-term Digital Radio program [Ruppe et al., 1997], which
developed a two-tier ad hoc network architecture. The clustering and link-state routing
was used in it. Meanwhile, within the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the
5
6Mobile Ad Hoc Networking (MANET) working group was born and began to standardize
routing protocols for ad hoc networks [MANET, 2003].
Ad hoc networks have their own characteristics that are significantly different
from those of fixed networks:
1) Dynamic topologies: Node mobility in an ad hoc network causes frequent changes
of network topology. Adjusting transmission and reception parameters such as
power can also affect the topology. Thus, the node needs to collect connectivity
information from other nodes periodically. An implication of this is an increased
message overhead in collecting topology information. In general, strategies
designed to support internetworking in ad hoc networks should handle such
topological changes with minimal overhead by limiting the scope of control
packets that may have to be generated and propagated after a change in topology.
2) Bandwidth-constrained, variable capacity, possibly asymmetric links: wireless
links have significantly lower capacity than their hardwired counterparts. One
effect of these relatively low to moderate link capacities is that congestion
happens more often than wired networks. This also makes Quality of Service
(QoS) harder to implement for some applications, which require support of a
certain QoS for optimal performance in a wireless environment.
3) Energy-constrained operation: Most of the ad hoc nodes run on batteries. That is,
network overhead needs to be kept at the minimum level so that energy is
conserved. Moreover, in order to conserve energy, nodes may power themselves
off. This requirement is contradictory to the need for topology update messages.
74) Wireless vulnerabilities and limited physical security: Mobile wireless networks
are generally more prone to information and physical security threats than fixed,
hardwired networks. Nodes roaming in a hostile environment such as a battlefield
have non-negligible probability of being compromised. That is, a malicious attack
may be launched from within the network by compromised nodes.
For the ad hoc network security, the following attributes: availability,
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation need to be considered
[Zhou and Haas, 1999; Karpijoki, 2001].
Availability ensures the survivability of network services despite denial-of-service
attacks. An attack can be launched at any layer of an ad hoc network. An adversary could
employ jamming to interfere with communication on the physical and media access
control layers; disrupt the routing protocol and disconnect the network on the network
layer; bring down high-level services on the higher layer. One useful measure is the key
management service [Fumy and Landrock, 1993], not only for ad hoc networks, but also
for traditional networks.
Confidentiality ensures that certain information is never disclosed to unauthorized
entities. Such information includes network transmission of sensitive information and
routing information. Due to the inherent characteristic of ad hoc networks, each node acts
as a router, and sensitive information needs multi-hop paths through network to other
nodes, thereby enlarging the possibility of leaking routing information.
Integrity requires that messages should not be altered or corrupted during
transmission. A message could be altered by a benign or malicious attack on the network.
8Authentication means that the participants somehow prove that their identities are
what they claim them to be. Authentication can be done by something users know,
embody or possess. For instance, something known can be a password, something
embodied can be a fingerprint, and something possessed can be a smart card.
Non-repudiation guarantees that the origin of a message cannot deny having sent
the message and the receiver cannot deny the reception. Non-repudiation is useful for
detection and isolation of compromised nodes. For instance, when node A receives an
erroneous message from node B, non-repudiation allows A to accuse B using this
message and to convince other nodes that B is compromised.
Based on the above-mentioned requirements, several traditional security
mechanisms still play important roles in achieving the above attributes. However, these
mechanisms are not as same as before [Maki, 2000]. Changes need to be added to these
mechanisms. This research focuses on routing protocols and encryptions.
Encryption can be used to hide the information during transmission or to store
information more safely. It is assumed to change the information in such a way that only
authorized users can interpret it. Therefore, encryption is used to gain confidentiality.
Protocols. Encryption alone does not accomplish security. It works as a part of
the security protocol used in a network. The protocol defines the steps how, for example,
the parties authenticate each other, and what infrastructure is needed for the
authentication. Protocols involve key management, and they may often require the use of
certificates.
92.2 Routing Protocols and Encryptions
2.2.1 Encryption
Cryptosystems can be divided into symmetric and asymmetric ones. In a symmetric
cryptosystem the encryption and decryption keys are identical. In asymmetric
cryptosystems, or public key systems, they are different from each other, and the
decryption key should not be derivable from the one used for encryption. The encryption
key of the parties is public, while the decryption keys are personal secrets of the
participants. For instance, in an encryption scheme, one party, the sender, generates a
ciphertext for a message with another party's public key. The other party, called the
recipient, decrypts the ciphertext with the corresponding private key to obtain the original
message. This encryption scheme can provide confidentiality of a message.
Beritelli et al. (2000) proposed a multiplayer chaotic encryption system based on
chaotic models with a dynamic key. The algorithm is symmetric with a dynamic chaotic
key. The key used for a masking sequence is made up of two factors: state and control
parameter. The combination of these two elements allows an encrypted message to be
decrypted. The system dynamically updates both the state and control parameter of the
chaotic series used for masking. The laws governing the update of the initial state and
control parameter are also of the chaotic type. As its extension to a more general stage, a
multiplayer key generation structure is proposed based on the most appropriate Chaotic
Map (CM). The initial state and control parameter of every stage are generated in the
previous stage following a chaotic law.
Asymmetric cryptosystem gains wider use than symmetric one on the Internet due
to an increasing security requirement. Sander and Tschudin (1998) proposed a
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homomorphic public-key encryption scheme that allows for non-interactive addition or
multiplication of two encrypted messages by manipulating ciphertext only. In this way,
the host can compute any function g(, y) on a hidden input x that is represented by a
polynomial. This approach was later improved by Sander et al. (1999) to non-interactive
evaluation of all functions g(-, y) on a hidden input x that can be represented by circuits
of logarithmic depth. However, this method is considered infeasible by Algesheimer et al.
(2001) using a privacy of a mobile shopping agent application example. They indicate
that any scheme in which some host is to learn information that depends on the agent's
current state cannot be secure.
Algesheimer et al. (2001) proposed a generic secure computation service. It
performs some cryptographic operations on behalf of a mobile code. Here, the mobile
code is a program which is produced by one entity and subsequently transferred to a
second entity through the network. This secure computation service resembles other
generic security services like a public-key infrastructure (PKI) or an anonymous re-
mailer. Their basic idea is based on [Yao, 1984 original sender 0 constructs an
encrypted circuit C computing two outputs and z. It sends C to the host H, encrypts all
keys in "key pairs" K for a third party T and does not include the key pairs in "key pairs"
U which correspond to c (denoted by U) so that H will not learn anything about. Next H
selects from K the encrypted keys representing input bit y and invokes T to decrypt them
in a single round of interaction. Then H evaluates the circuit and obtains z; it also returns
the keys in the circuit output representing to 0, who can determine from this.
Taking the advantage of the inherent redundancy in ad hoc network - multiple
routes between nodes, Zhou and Haas (1999) proposed a distributed, asynchronous key-
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management service to defend routing against denial-of-service attacks. Because nodes
are possibly compromised, the network should not have any central entities but a
distributed architecture. The authors present a distributed key management system where
the private key of a trusted service is divided to n servers. To create a signature with the
private key, at least k out of the n servers need to combine their knowledge. Combining
the shares would not reveal the actual private key. The correctness of the signature would,
as usual, be verifiable with the public key of the service. The method is called threshold
cryptography [Desmedt, 1994]: an (n, k) threshold cryptography scheme allows n parties
to share the ability to perform a cryptographic operation (e.g., creating a digital signature).
Any k parties can perform the operation jointly, whereas it is infeasible for a less number
of parties than k. If at most k-1 servers can be compromised at a time, a false signature
cannot be created.
2.2.2 Routing Protocol
Many different protocols have been proposed to solve the multi-hop routing problem in
ad hoc networks based on different assumptions and intuitions. An ad hoc network
routing must be simple, robust, and should minimize the control message exchanges. Ad
hoc routing needs to be simple because it is performed by generic mobile hosts that have
limited resources and power. Routing algorithms that consume excessive bandwidth for
routing control message exchanges may not be appropriate for wireless networks. The
topology of an ad hoc network is inherently volatile and routing algorithms must be
robust against frequent topology changes caused by host movements [Lee and Kim,
2000].
12
Ad hoc routing can be classified into proactive and reactive ones based on when
routes are determined. The former continuously makes routing decisions so that routes
are immediately available when packets need to be transmitted with no regard to when
and how frequently such routes are desired. It relies on an underlying routing table update
mechanism that involves the constant propagation of routing information. Its example
protocols are Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) [Perkins and Bhagwat,
1994], and Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) [Murthy and Garcia-Luna-Aceves, 1996].
The reactive routing determines routes on an on-demand basis: when a node has a packet
to transmit, it queries the network for a route. Its example protocols are Temporally-
Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) [Park and Corson, 1997], Ad hoc On-Demand
Distance Vector (AODV) [Perkins and Royer, 1999], and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)
[Johnson and Maltz, 1996]. Each has its disadvantages: proactive routing consumes a
great deal of resources to exchange routing information while reactive routing may
rapidly lose their validity in an ad hoc network because its topology changes rapidly.
Multipath on-demand protocols try to alleviate these problems by computing multiple
paths in a single path discovery attempt. Multiple paths can be used to balance load by
forwarding data packets on multiple paths at the same time or as a backup to route
discovery, i.e., new route discovery is needed only when all possible paths fail. The
former one will be discussed in the following chapters.
Recently, the use of geographic positions as a means of routing has become
increasingly popular in mobile ad-hoc networks. One important advantage of using
positions for routing is its inherent ability to alleviate the need for the development of
separate complicated techniques for mobility management. In addition, position-based
13
routing strategies, since they do not require the exchanges of routing tables, are especially
attractive in highly mobile environments where topological changes are frequent and
routing tables become obsolete very quickly [Hou and Li, 1985]. In general, using
geographic positions as a means of routing/mobility management has the following
advantages:
1) It makes feasible the realization of a flat routing architecture, thus, eliminating the
complexities associated with maintaining rigid, multiple-tier hierarchical
architectures, therefore making the network robust and 'fluid' in nature,
2) It minimizes the amount of initial manual configuration required to set-up the
network, thus making the network completely self-organizing, and
3)	 It makes feasible the process of routing packets with geographic destinations.
Because some of the protocols' characteristics will be utilized later, a brief review
of some important routing protocols is presented below.
Destination -Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV)
DSDV [Perkins and Bhagwat, 1994] is a multihop distance vector routing
protocol requiring each node to broadcast routing updates periodically. It is based on the
idea of the classical Bellman-Ford routing algorithm. Each node in the system maintains
a routing table containing the next-hop information for each reachable destination. Each
route has a sequence number. If a new entry is given, it prefers the route with the greatest
sequence number, or if different routes' sequence numbers are the same, it chooses the
metric with the lowest value. Each node advertises an increasing even sequence number
for itself. When the source node determines that the destination node is unreachable, it
advertises the next odd sequence for the route that has failed with an infinite metric count
14
number. Any node receiving this infinite metric count updates its table for the matching
route and waits until a greater sequence number with non-infinite metric count is received.
Its advantage over traditional distance vector protocols is that it guarantees loop-freedom
[Perkins et al., 2001].
Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP)
WRP [Murthy and Aceves, 1996] is a vector routing protocol. Each node in the
network maintains a table containing routing, distance, link cost information and a
message retransmission list. Distance table of a source node S contains the distance of
each destination node D via each neighbor N of S. It also contains the downstream
neighbor of N through which this path is realized. The routing table of S contains the
distance of each destination node D from node S, and the predecessor and successor of S
on this path. It also contains a tag to identify if the entry is a simple path, a loop or invalid.
Storing predecessor and successor into the table helps in detecting loops and the
counting-to-infinity problem. Link cost table contains cost of link to each neighbor of the
node and the number of timeouts since last error-free message was received from that
neighbor. Message transmission list contains information about which neighbor has not
acknowledged its update message, allowing a node to retransmit the update message to
that neighbor.
Nodes exchange routing tables with their neighbors periodically or when links
change. Nodes in a message transmission list must acknowledge back to update messages.
If there is no change in a routing table since the last update, a node has to send an idle
hello message to ensure connectivity. On receiving an updated message, a node modifies
its distance table and looks for better paths using this new information. Any newly found
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path is sent back to original nodes so that they can update their tables. A node also
updates its routing table if a new path is better than the existing one. When a node
receives ACK, it updates its message transmission list. This algorithm checks for
consistency of all its neighbors every time it detects a change to any of its neighbors. It
eliminates looping and converges fast [Celebi, 2001].
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)
DSR [Johnson and Maltz, 1996] uses source routing rather than hop-by-hop
routing, with each packet to be routed carrying in its header the complete, ordered list of
nodes through which the packet must pass. The DSR protocol consists of two
mechanisms: Route Discovery and Route Maintenance. To perform the former, the
source node S broadcasts a route request packet that is flooded through the network in a
controlled manner and answered by a route reply packet from either the destination node
or another that knows a route to the destination. To reduce the cost of the former, each
node maintains a cache of source routes it has learned or overheard. This node uses cache
to limit the frequency and propagation of route requests. Route Maintenance is the
mechanism by which a packet's sender S detects if the network topology has changed
such that it can no longer use its route to the destination D because two nodes listed in the
route have moved out of range of each other. When Route Maintenance indicates a
source route is broken, S is notified with a route error packet. S can then attempt to use
any other route to D already in its cache or can invoke Route Discovery again to find a
new route. DSR's key advantage is that intermediate nodes do not need to maintain up-to-
date routing information in order to route the packets they forward, since the packets
themselves already contain all the routing decisions. This feature, coupled with the on-
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demand nature of the protocol, eliminates the need for the periodic route advertisement
and neighbor detection packets present in other protocols.
Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)
AODV [Perkins and Royer, 1999] is based on a hop-by-hop routing approach.
When a source node needs a route to a destination, it broadcasts a Route Request (RREQ)
message to its neighbors. Each node receiving the message creates a reverse route to the
source. This message is flooded until the information required is complete by either
meeting the destination or meeting a node that has a known route to the destination.
Route Reply (RREP) message is sent back to the source. Duplicate copies of the RREQ
packet received at any node are discarded. Each node receiving the reply message creates
a forward route to the destination. Thus each node remembers only the next hop required
to reach any of the hosts, not the whole route. Once the source node receives RREP, it
may begin to forward packets to the destination. If the source later receives a RREP
message containing a shorter path, it may update its routing information for that
destination and begin using the shorter route.
Each RREQ carries a parameter named hopcount that represents the number of
hops from the source node to the node handling the request. Any node that wants to
forward RREQ will increase the hopcount by one. After some nodes have successfully
found a route to the destination node, the flood is still ongoing throughout the whole
network until the predetermined time is out.
Position-Based Routing
Position information can be used in conjunction with 'on-demand' routing
protocols in order to limit the scope of the flood search that occurs when a source
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attempts to find a route to a destination. Location-Aided Routing (LAR) [Ko and Vaidya,
1998] couples DSR with position knowledge, by using the last known destination
position as the origin of an uncertainty circle, which is called the 'request zone', and
limiting the flood search for a destination route within that request zone. In [Basagni et
al., 1999], global node position knowledge is used as a means of constructing a network
connectivity graph, which is subsequently used to construct a source route from a given
source to a given destination; thus, there is no need to perform flood search as in DSR.
However, it should be noted that the connectivity graph constructed using exclusively the
position knowledge might not necessarily correspond to the actual network connectivity
due to the existence of terrain obstructions. In addition, the drawback associated with the
source routing in general, is that the route computed originally at the source may become
obsolete as the packet is 'in transit', resulting in packet loss.
Distance Routing Effect Algorithm for Mobility (DREAM) [Basagni et al., 1998]
and Fisheye State Routing (FSR) [Pei et al., 2000] are two protocols that are based on the
existence of multiple routing events, and the exploitation of the 'near-far' routing effect.
DREAM is a position-based routing protocol that utilizes an array of position-update
triggering timers, where timer[k] has a larger period (expiration interval) than timer[k];
therefore, position updates triggered by the expiration of timer[k] have a larger
dissemination radius than the updates triggered by the expiration of timer[k-1]. FSR is a
link-state routing protocol that utilizes the same update triggering/dissemination
mechanism, but instead of position updates, it sends link-state updates.
In [Xu et al., 2000; Xu et al., 2000], the Position-guided Sliding-window Routing
(PSR) was proposed and evaluated. PSR is also a position-based routing protocol that
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exploits the 'near-far' routing effect. It, however, differs from DREAM and FSR in that it
actively combines link-state routing with position-based routing. The link-state
component of PSR provides for QoS routing and proactive bandwidth management
within the local vicinity of a node (referred to as the 'core' zone), while the position-
based component provides the position-update dissemination control mechanism, which
is necessary for scalability.
Since Broch et al. (1998) first introduced a quantitative analysis method
comparing the performance of a variety of multi-hop ad hoc network routing protocols,
much related work [Boukerche, 2001; Perkins et al., 2001; Celebi, 2001; Cano and
Manzoni, 2000; Ahuja et al., 2000; Royer and Toh, 1999] has been done. Royer and Toh
(1999) analyzed the time complexity, communication complexity, and other parameters
of eight different ah hoc network protocols, while Broch et al. (1998) quantized routing
overhead, packet delivery ratio, and other parameters using a modified discrete event
simulator - ns [Fall and Varadha, 1997]. Each protocol has its own advantages and
disadvantages. None of them can be claimed as absolutely better than the others. For
instance, Broch et al. (1998) found that DSDV delivered virtually all data packets when
node mobility rate and movement speed were low, but failed to converge as node
mobility increased. TORA delivered over 90% of the packets in scenarios when overhead
was low, but when overhead was high, it was unable to handle all of the traffic generated
by the routing protocol and a significant fraction of data packets were dropped. Perkins et
al. (2001) found that the attribute of aggressive caching helped DSR at low loads and also
kept its routing load down. The overhead of DSR is potentially larger than that of AODV
since each DSR packet has to carry full routing information, whereas in AODV packets
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need contain only the destination address. Combining the related work [Boukerche, 2001;
Perkins et al., 2001; Celebi, 2001; Broch et al., 1998; Royer and Toh, 1999], Table 2.1
summarizes the comparison results of four typical routing protocols in terms of their time
complexity, communication complexity, packet delivery ratio, average packet delay,
routing load, power consumption, multicast capability and security.
2.2.3 Protocol Security
Routing protocols should be robust against both dynamically changing topology and
malicious attacks. There is no standard protocol for ad hoc networks because ad hoc
network itself is under research.
There are two sources of threats to routing protocols: external and internal attacks.
Typically, an attacker can eavesdrop routing information and inject erroneous routing
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information, replay old routing information, or distort routing information. An attacker
can successfully partition a network or introduce excessive traffic load into the network
by causing retransmission and inefficient routing.
More severe kind of threat comes from compromised nodes within the internal
network. A compromised node can broadcast incorrect routing information to other nodes.
Detection of such nodes through routing information is difficult in an ad hoc network
because of its dynamically changing topology. An invalid piece of routing information
can be generated by a compromised node, or as the result of topology changes. It is
inherently difficult to distinguish between them. On the other hand, false routing
information generated by compromised nodes can be considered the same as the outdated
information. As long as there are sufficiently many correct nodes, the routing protocol
should be able to find routes that bypass these compromised nodes. Therefore, the
protocols that are capable of finding multiple paths such as AODV, TORA, and DSR,
have an advantage.
Diversity coding [Ayanoglu, 1993] uses multiple paths to transmit data, and does
not make any retransmission. Its basic idea is to transmit redundant information through
additional routes for error detection and correction. For example, if there are n disjoint
routes between two nodes, n - r channels can be used to transmit data and other r
channels used to transmit redundant information. Even if certain routes are compromised,
the receiver may still be able to validate messages and recover them from errors using the
redundant information from the additional r channels. This method is developed for static
network, and applicable for ad hoc network.
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Smith et al. (1997) studied vulnerabilities and provided countermeasures for
distance-vector routing protocols. They managed to do it by using the predecessor
information specified in the path-finding class of distance-vector proposals. The same
method can be adopted for securing Mobile Ad-Hoc Network distance-vector protocols.
As a result, routing messages should be protected as well as the user data, and multiple
path transmission should always be used.
Network management is a process of controlling a complex data network so as to
maximize its efficiency and productivity [Leinwand and Fang, 1993; Xu et al., 2000]. It
can be functionally divided into five areas defined by the International Standards
Organization (ISO): fault management, configuration management, security management,
performance management, and accounting management. Simple network management
protocol (SNMP) [Stallings, 1998] is the most widely deployed management protocol
standard for the management of IP-based networks and Internets. SNMPv 1 defined a
protocol for exchanging information between one or more management systems and a
number of agents, provides a framework for formatting and storing management
information, and defines a number of general-purpose management information variables
or objects.
The current typical protocols in ad hoc network do not pay much attention to the
security issue yet. Future improvements about these protocols need to focus on the
security aspect, as done in current standard protocols of Internet such as Secure Sockets
Layer [Netscape, 2001], and authentication header and encryption technology used in
IPv6 [2001]. Some detailed measures include neighbor-to-neighbor digital signature of
routing updates, the addition of sequence numbers and timestamps to the updates, the
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addition of acknowledgments and retransmission of routing updates [Kumar, 1993],
cryptographic protection of the hop information in a path, and IPSec [IPSEC, 2001]
authentication headers deployed along with the necessary key management to distribute
keys to the members of the ad hoc network.
In general, network attacks range from passive information steal to active
message impersonation and distortion. The security provisioning mechanism can be
improved based on multipath traffic dispersion against network attacks along the
information path. The approach proposed in [Yang and Papavassiliou, 2001] can be used
to improve network security so that the possibility of unauthorized information leakage
induced by attacks along the path is minimized. Moreover a heuristic multipath traffic
dispersion scheme has been proposed in order to minimize the impact of network attacks.
This approach seems applicable for the mobile ad hoc networks where many different
paths are often available.
2.3 Ad Hoc Network Performance Analysis
2.3.1 Network Performance Metrics
There are several performance metrics used in the evaluation of network performance and
routing protocol performance:
1) Throughput: packets received by the destinations, usually measured in Mb/s. This
metric can be overall throughput or average per flow throughput.
2) Average end-to-end delay of data packets: It includes all possible delays caused
by buffering during route discovery latency, queuing at the interface queue,
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retransmission delays at the Medium Access Control (MAC), and the propagation
and transfer times.
3) Packet delivery ratio: The ratio of the data packets delivered to the destinations to
those generated by the sources. This metric is always less than one.
4) Normalized routing load: The number of routing packets transmitted per data
packet delivered at the destination. Each hop-wise transmission of a routing
packet is counted as one transmission.
The first two metrics are the most important for best-effort traffic. The routing
load metric evaluates the efficiency of the routing protocol. Note that these metrics are
not completely independent. For instance, lower packet delivery fraction means that the
delay metric is evaluated with fewer samples.
The networking "context" in which a protocol's performance is measured is
considered [MANET, 2003]. Essential parameters that should be varied include:
1) Network size: measured in the number of nodes.
2) Network connectivity: the average degree of a node (i.e. the average number of
neighbors of a node).
3) Topological rate of change: the speed with which a network's topology changes.
4) Link capacity: effective link speed measured in bits/second, after accounting for
losses due to multiple access, coding, framing, etc.
5) Fraction of unidirectional links: how effectively does a protocol perform as a
function of the presence of unidirectional links?
6) Traffic patterns: how effective is a protocol in adapting to non-uniform or busty
traffic patterns?
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7) Mobility: when, and under what circumstances, is temporal and spatial
topological correlation relevant to the performance of a routing protocol? In these
cases, what is the most appropriate model for simulating node mobility in an ad
hoc network?
8) Fraction and frequency of sleeping nodes - how does a protocol perform in the
presence of sleeping and awakening nodes?
2.3.2 System Measurement Metrics
Three ways are available to evaluate a system.
1) Measurement-based evaluation: This is the most accurate method, but could be the
most time-consuming and expensive, since one has to have the real system to take
the measurements. The method may be infeasible for some early-stage designs
and ideas.
2) Discrete-event simulation: it is perhaps the most common way these days to
evaluate a system, especially when it comes to a network system in the design
phase. Although one does not need to construct a real system, it may take a long
time to construct a simulator to represent a real one. The comprehensive
simulation runs also cost much, sometimes unaffordable computing resources.
3) Analytical modeling: the less costly and more efficient method is perhaps the
third one. It has been a common belief that well-built analytical models are able to
shed more lights into the system than the previous two methods. They, however,
may require simulation or small-scale pilot system run to support their accuracy
and balance the believability.
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Despite the nice features of analytical modeling approaches, one needs to be
cautious that it may be at the expense of accuracy and believability because of
simplification in an attempt to make the model analytically tractable. So, it is indeed very
important for us to use alternative methods to check the correctness of the models.
Simulation methods are the widely used methods to analyze the network
performance. There are several simulation tools that have been developed using in the
design and performance modeling of ad hoc network, such as OPNET [OPNET, 2003]
and Network Simulator (NS2) [Fall and Varadhan, 1997]. Comparing with the
commercial software OPNET, NS2 has an advantage. It offers the open source code, is
free and thus can be modified and reconstructed easily.
Network Simulator (NS2)
NS2 [Fall and Varadhan, 1997] is developed at the University of California at
Berkeley. Its extension to mobile ad hoc network is developed by the Monarch project at
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU). The CMU extension provides the support for
accurately simulating a realistic wireless physical channel, data link and MAC layer
models in multihop wireless networks. The radio propagation model is a combination of a
free space propagation model (attenuation 1/r2) at short distance and a two-way ground
reflection model at long distance (attenuation 1/r4) with omnidirectional antenna. The
distributed coordination function (DCF) defined in IEEE 802.11b for the wireless LAN is
used as the MAC layer model to prevent the hidden terminal problem and capture
phenomenon. This is to simulate a commercial radio interface card, i.e., the WaveLAN
from Lucent, which is a shared-media radio with a nominal bit-rate of 2 Mbps and radio
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range of 250 meters. A detailed description of simulation environment and models can
also be found in [McCann and Floyd, 2003].
Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN)
Petri Nets (PN) [Zhou and Venkateëh, 1999] is a graphical and mathematical
modeling tool whose nodes are partitioned into two sets, places and transitions. They are
widely used to model and analyze such discrete event systems (DES) as communication,
manufacturing, and transportation systems. Petri nets are excellent tools to model and
analyze the synchronization, parallel activities, and conflicts among the processes in a
system.
The stochastic Petri net model is obtained from the Petri net model by associating
a probability distribution function to the firing time of each transition. Additional
constructs are often present as well. In the generalized stochastic Petri net model
[Ajmone-Marsan et al., 1984], only two distribution types are allowed: exponential, and
deterministic with time delay value 0. Transitions with an associated exponential
distribution are said to be timed; transitions with zero time distribution are said to be
immediate. In the Extended Stochastic Petri net model [Dugan et al., 1985], the
transitions are classified in a similar way, but an arbitrary distribution can be associated
to each timed transition. If two or more conflicting transitions should fire at the same
moment (this event has a zero probability if the distribution is continuous), a probability
function must specify the probability that a subset of transitions actually fire. It allows the
quick construction of a simplified abstract model that is numerically solved for different
model parameters. SPNP [Ciardo et al., 1989], based on SPN, is used to build an
approximate model for a quick numerical analysis of network performance. Besides the
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exponential distributions, SPNP allows us to try several distributions, such as Erlang and
deterministic distribution, to analyze the performance under different situations. SPN
provides a framework not only for modeling and simulation but also verification and
formal analysis of a designed system. Such capabilities are very important in ad hoc
network design.
Due to the advantages in quick construction and numerical analysis of Petri nets,
several related works have been done to investigate the characteristics of networks.
Xiong et al. (2002) modeled and simulated ad hoc routing protocol using Colored
Petri Nets (CPN). They proposed a topology approximation (TA) mechanism to solve the
problem of topology changes, which is an inherent characteristic of ad hoc network and
perform simulations of AODV. Their work mainly focus on the routing, not the
performance of network.
Ciardo et al. (1995) modeled a scalable high speed interconnect, which is
continuous hexagonal mesh like wired network with stochastic Petri Nets. They presented
both exact and tractable approximate SPN model and compared it with simulation results
based on CPN. Their work can only be applied to a specific network. The result is not
persuadable because it is based on the comparison of two Petri nets models.
Chen et al. (2001) developed a Markov Decision Process (MDP) to analyze call
admission control policy for wireless communication networks. They used Stochastic
Reward Nets (SRN) to model the paradigm, with handoff call dropout time information
incorporated into the decision policy. Their approach can be further developed into ad
hoc network.
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Trivedi et al. (2000) introduced some recent research on SPN including stochastic
reward nets, fluid stochastic Petri nets, and so on. They can be used in ATM networks,
Ethernet Bridge, and RF recovery in wireless communication. The author gave two
examples in ATM networks to illustrate the performance analysis of computer networks.
None of above researches address on the overall performance of ad hoc network,
which is our purpose and will be addressed in the following chapters.
2.4 Summary
Due to the increasing interest in ad hoc network, sustainable development issues have
been raised in this area. There are still much research work to do. This chapter reviews
some of the recent methodology and technology development activities on ad hoc
network design. The issues include the concept of ad hoc network, ad hoc network
routing protocols, network security and analysis on network performance. This chapter
also reviews some basic tools in the research area and makes comparisons between
different routing protocols to make decision. This research addresses some critical issues
on ad hoc network security, routing protocol, and performance modeling and evaluation.
It should facilitate the design and implementation of robust ad hoc network.
CHAPTER 3
PERFORMANCE ENHANCED SECURE
AD HOC ON-DEMAND ROUTING PROTOCOL
In QoS routing for wired networks, multiple path routing is popularly used. Due to the
advantage of the inherent redundancy in ad hoc network - multiple routes between nodes,
many different protocols have been proposed based on different assumptions and
intuitions. Marina and Das (2001) proposed "advertised hopcount" to guarantee loop-
freedom for an on-demand distance vector protocol. The "advertised hopcount" is a route
table entry. They use multipath as a backup in route discovery to reduce routing overhead
and end-to-end delay. Routing On-Demand Acyclic Multipath (ROAM) [Raju and
Garcia-Luna-Aceves, 1999] is an on-demand, multipath distance vector algorithm based
on diffusing computations. It can detect network partitions like TORA. But it requires
close coordination between nodes because state information must be maintained at each
node during the route discovery. Thus ROAM is better suited for static ad hoc networks
or networks with low node mobility. Split Multipath Routing (SMR) [Lee and Gerla,
2001] uses a modified flooding algorithm and the data traffic is split among the multiple
paths. SMR attempts to build maximally disjoint routes to avoid having certain links from
being congested. Its multipath is used as a backup in route discovery. Pearlman et al.
(2000) analyze the performance impacts of alternative path routing for load balancing.
They use diversity injection to compute node-disjoint paths. Leung et al. (2001) proposed
distributed multi-path dynamic source routing protocol based on the existing Dynamic
Source Routing protocol to improve QoS support with respect to end-to-end reliability. It
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seeks to compute a set of unicast routes that can satisfy a minimum end-to-end reliability
requirement.
This chapter proposes the use of multipath in an on-demand distance vector
protocol to achieve better performance and security. It is organized as follows: Section
3.1 proposes the "Security Level" concept and gives the probability analysis. Section 3.2
proposes a performance enhanced routing protocol (SOR) embedding a "maximum
hopcount" factor to restrict the number of routing packets for a particular purpose.
Section 3.3 implements SOR based on AODV. Section 3.4 evaluates the performance of
the proposed protocol by simulations. Section 3.5 gives the summery.
3.1 Security Enhancement
So far many protocols have been proposed and their performance has been well
researched. But the security issues and concerns have not been addressed in depth. In
general, there are two sources of threats: external and internal attacks. Typically, an
attacker can eavesdrop routing information and inject erroneous routing information,
replay old routing information, or distort routing information. An attacker can
successfully partition a network or introduce excessive traffic load into the network by
causing retransmission and inefficient routing. More severe attack comes from
compromised nodes in the internal network. A compromised node can broadcast incorrect
routing information to other nodes. Its detection through routing information is difficult
in an ad hoc network because of its dynamically changing topology: an invalid piece of
routing information can be generated by a compromised node, or because of the result of
topology changes. It is difficult to distinguish between them. On the other hand, false
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routing information generated by compromised nodes can be considered the same as the
outdated information. As long as there are sufficiently many correct nodes, the routing
protocol should be able to find new routes that pass by these compromised nodes.
Therefore, on-demand protocols that are capable of finding multiple paths such as TORA,
AODV, and DSR, have a potential advantage to enhance the security. Yet such advantage
is not fully explored. The following discussions mainly focus on the combination of the
multiple paths into AODV for the security enhancement purpose.
3.1.1 Security Level Concept
Suppose there is a battlefield scenario. Two high-rank military officers want to establish a
route to communicate important messages with each other. Because these two officers do
not lie in a small region that can enable their communications directly, the route has to
pass through some low-rank military officers and soldiers inevitably. Apparently they
don't want to disclose these messages to them. Their routing information or messages are
more important than those of ordinary soldiers. Therefore, they should be well protected.
From the security aspect, when a node is compromised, one needs to prevent information
from being leaked or decrypted to this node, which passes through it. Consider certain
ability of one node to do the cryptanalysis, an officer's routing information should be
harder to be decrypted or acquired than soldiers'. Such situation and multipath routing
possibility in ad hoc network area motivate us to classify the mobile nodes into different
levels and develop a revised protocol to meet different security requirements.
A "Security Level" concept is proposed and embedded into the routing protocols
that allow multipath routing. The difference between traditional hierarchy of privileges
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and security levels lies in a different communication manner. Ad hoc network
communication requires the participation of a lower rank node while a traditional one
does not. In a structure embedded with security levels, high priority level nodes keep
their message or routing information in a high level security such that the low priority
level nodes can only forward this message without the ability to look through the
encrypted message. Low priority level nodes are required to encrypt or transmit
information with only low-level security. While traditional multipath routing is used in
route recovery when a route is broken, one wants to employ it for more secure packet
transmission. That is, after a node finds multipaths to another node, it separates its
protocol data unit into several pieces and transmit each piece via one path.
This structure integrated with threshold cryptography [Desmedt, 1994] can
significantly improve network security. Threshold cryptography could distribute the trust
in key management. In an (n, t+1) threshold cryptography, suppose that n nodes share the
ability to perform a cryptographic operation such as digital signature so that any t+1
nodes can perform this decryption operation jointly. It is infeasible to do such operation
by only t nodes, i.e., it is impractical if t nodes want to attack this system corporately.
Each node participating in the encryption is called a "neighbor node" of the sender
because in the framework, each node does such operation with its neighbor node while
finding the route. In order to do the encryption, the private key k of the sender is divided
into n shares (s', s2, ..., sr), assigning one share to each of its neighbor nodes. For the
node that wants to sign a certificate, each of its neighbors generates a partial signature
(PS(m, sl, PS(m, s2), PS(m, sn) for the certificate using its own private key share and
sends it to the receiver. Using t+1 correct partial signatures, a receiver can figure out the
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signature for the certificate. If at most t neighbor nodes are compromised, these
compromised nodes cannot generate correctly signed certificates with only their partial
signatures.
Consider RSA signature generation and decryption. When signing or decrypting,
one computes
g mput(share can be computed by neighbor nodes and sent together with every
node's identification to the receiver. With enough neighbor nodes responding, the
receiver can compute constants, B for all i E B and then evaluate (3.6).
In a protocol embedded with security levels, each level has a corresponding
number: t. The higher t, the more security provided. In the battlefiled situation, t can be
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related to the rank. This number means when a node wants to send a message, the
message is encrypted with an (n, t+1) threshold scheme. Because an on-demand routing
protocol can find multipath routes, the sender needs to compare route reply messages in
order to choose n shortest routes to send message, which ensures security when at most t
paths can be compromised at a time. That means, when the first RREP message returns to
the sender, it can assign one share of its private key k, which has been divided into n
shares, to its neighbor node of the first route, and use the first route to forward the
partially encrypted messages to the receiver. This process continues until the n th route is
found. After that, if a new route is found, the sender compares all the paths to find the
shortest one among them to do the encryption. Even if one cannot find n paths to the
destination and t is less than n-1, t+1 paths are still effective in some cases because the
receiver can get the correct message using t+/ partial signatures. If the receiver only
receives less than or equal to t partial signatures or the sender doesn't find enough routes,
this transmission fails and the retransmission begins. The difference between multipath
routing and the proposed method is that multipath routing doesn't classify the mobile
nodes and give every node the same bandwidth to transmit message. Ad hoc network
resource is saved by giving different security-level nodes different ability to transmit,
especially in a situation where only few high security level nodes exist among all the
participating nodes.
Consider internal attacks. When one node is compromised, it could generate an
incorrect partial signature that would yield an invalid signature. This is prohibited by
verifying the validity of a computed signature using a node's public key. If the
verification fails, the receiver tries another set of t+/ partial signatures. This process
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continues until the receiver constructs the correct signature from t+1 correct partial
signatures.
Figure 3.1 An illustration of security level.
In a case illustrated in Figure 3.1, which includes three security levels, a high rank
officer A wants to communicate with another high rank officer B in an ad hoc network.
Decided by A's level, a (3, 2) threshold cryptography scheme is chosen to sign
certificates. First, node A finds a path to node B based on an on-demand routing protocol.
After receiving route reply messages, A needs to choose three shortest paths to distribute
private key k to neighbor nodes 1, 2, and 3, named sly, s2, and s3. Then these neighbor
nodes all generate partial signatures and forward the signatures to node B. When route
two is broken or one node in this route is compromised which lead to the failure to
submit s2, B still has the ability to generate the signature mk of m signed by A's private
key k finally. However, if the link from s3 to B is also broken, then the transmission
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cannot succeed. Node A needs to find additional shortest paths. In case such paths do not
exit, A cannot send any message to B successfully.
3.1.2 Probability Analysis
Yang and Papavassiliou (2001) demonstrated that redundant traffic dispersion had a
smaller connection intrusion probability than that of single path routing. The proposed
scheme is evaluated by calculating the probability that a transmission from the source
results in successful packet reception at the destination via (n, t+1) threshold
cryptography.
There are three assumptions to simplify the analysis without losing the generality:
1) The mean time of packet transmission is much smaller than the mean time
between variations in network topology. This means that the topology of the
network does not change significantly while a packet is being transmitted.
2) The transmission is node-disjoint routing, which means there are no shared
intermediate nodes or links from the source to the destination.
3)	 Every node has the same probability for it to receive successful attack, which is
defined as p.
Suppose that one has a scheme that includes N nodes and n paths. A path being
compromised means that at least one node on that path is compromised. If a T(n, t)
scheme, which means an (n, t) threshold cryptography scheme, is compromised, then at
least t paths in this scheme are compromised. Each path i has Ai nodes and k1 is the
number of nodes being likely to be compromised in this path. Suppose that one has total
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K nodes being compromised. Then the probability that a T(n, t) scheme is compromised
is given by
/4/ is used to guarantee that there are total K nodes being compromised and use u2
to make sure that at least t paths are compromised.
For instance, suppose that one has a four path routing scheme similar to Figure
3.1. Each path has two, three, four, and five nodes, respectively. Each node has the same
probability of 0.2 being compromised. Give the condition that total K nodes have been
compromised among all four paths, Figure 3.2 compares the probability that a T(4, t)
scheme is compromised with different t. It is observed that all three curves approach zero
after four nodes the in the total scheme are compromised. This happens because four or
more nodes being successfully attacked is an event with small possibility in the scheme
by giving the small probability p that each node is compromised. T(4, 3) scheme has a
much larger probability to keep the information safer than the other two. Especially when
two nodes are attacked, the probability that a T(4, 3) scheme leaks out the information is
zero. Thus, T(4, 3) scheme can be assigned to a high security level compared to other two
schemes. T(4,1), which means the system is considered unsafe if one of its paths is
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compromised, is a reference that will not be adopted usually because it has no advantage
than single path routing. Even worse, because T(4, 1) scheme needs 3 additional paths to
transmit the same information comparing with single path routing, it wastes bandwidth
that is an important factor in ad hoc networks.
Figure 3.2 Comparison of probabilities being compromised with different t.
3.2 Hopcount Restriction
An ad hoc network has been designed for use by mobile nodes. In some cases, a
collection of mobile nodes may operate in a fixed relationship to each other and move
together within an area where an ad hoc network has formed. Unlike position-based
routing protocol such as LAR and DSR using Global Positioning System [Basagni et al.,
1999], one assumes that the moving range of nodes is pre-designated while position-
based routing protocol use geographic position as an inherent property. Given a
simulation field with dimensions 670m x 670m used in ns2, this research simulates the
routing under a random situation, i.e., each node starts its movement from a random
location to a random destination with a random speed. For 20 mobile nodes, all of the
routing procedure's hopcount is less than or equal to three while the hopcount used
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needed for 30 nodes is less than or equal to four, as shown in Figure 3.3. This figure
implies that the routing procedures end in limited hops. In other words, any route request
packet beyond that hopcount is not useful. Furthermore, the hopcount depends on the
dimension of the region that holds the mobile nodes. The larger the area, the more hops
needed to find a path. This is reasonable because of the limited propagation range of a
node.
Suppose that the nominal radio range for a wireless LAN is d (unit is meter).
Given an x x y rectangular region, assuming that the nodes are uniformly distributed, it is
predicted that most connections use at most h hops to reach the destination where:
where La] means the largest integer less than or equal to a.
Equation (3.8) can be used only when the number of nodes reaches certain
density. One problem in the communication between arbitrary nodes is the connectivity
of wireless links when mobile nodes are likely to be moving independently of one
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another. Consequently, node mobility causes the frequent failure and activation of links,
leading to increased network congestion while the network's routing algorithm reacts to
the topology changes. Unlike fixed infrastructure network where link failure is
comparatively rare events, the rate of link failure due to node mobility is the primary
obstacle to routing in ad hoc network.
If the nodes are distributed sparsely, hopcount becomes a useless metric because
most of the nodes are unreachable from others. Hence, the relationship between node
density and the connectivity has to be explored.
Consider a given square area with dimensions 670m x 670m. Nodes are generated
using a random number generator [Park and Miller, 1988] provided by ns2 and uniformly
distributed. Consider only the topology without considering network parameters such as
bandwidth, congestion window size, energy, and so on. When n nodes in this area, all
possible connections are given by:
Note that there are multiple paths between two nodes. The wireless propagation
range d used in simulation is set to 250 meters, which is similar to a Lucent's WaveLAN
[Tuch, 1993] that is a shared-media radio with a nominal bit-rate of 2 Mb/sec. Under the
wireless situation, one unreachable connection means that two nodes cannot
communicate directly or via any intermediate nodes. Counting all unreachable
connections, the unreachable rate is defined as:
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The unreachable rate value varies for every simulation because of the random
case. After a large-scale test, a statistical result of the unreachable rate versus the required
number of nodes in a given region is obtained as shown in Figure 3.4. Each result is
based on 5000 simulations. When there are only 2 nodes in this region, the unreachable
rate is as high as 70%. Considering an acceptable unreachable rate of 0.1, which means
that 90% connection attempts can be reached, at least 16 nodes are needed in this area.
Figure 3.5 shows another simulation based on the dimensions 1000m x 1000m.
The generated curve is similar to the previous one. Furthermore, the number of nodes that
represent an acceptable unreachable rate of 0.1 increases proportional to the area, which
means n can be acquired by Figure 3.5 or the calculation below:
One can derive from (3.8) as follows: in a square (x x x) region and n nodes
moving in this region, most connections, which means that the unreachable rate is below
0.1, use at most h hops to reach the destination where:
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Given (3.9), the hopcount of a routing packet is restricted by discarding it if it is
beyond h. The research uses this method to decrease the number of routing packets,
reduce the flooding phenomena, and save network resources. Note that (3.8) is suitable
for rectangular region while (3.9) is suitable for square region. Using these two formulas
with the security level scheme, we expect to reach a good tradeoff between resource
consumption and security requirement.
Based on the ad hoc on-demand routing protocol and "Security Level" concept, a
performance enhanced routing protocol (SOR) embedding a "maximum hopcount" factor
is proposed to restrict the number of routing packets.
3.3 Implementation of SOR
The security advantage due to multipaths has been explained before using probability
analysis. Even if one piece is captured by a compromised node, the whole information
remains safe. The "Security Level" concept can be used to enhance the security aspect of
a routing protocol bound with the identity of a user. Without this binding, any user can
impersonate anybody else and obtain the privileges associated with higher security levels.
To prevent this, messages must be protected by using authentication, confidentiality and
integrity services, such as those involving the generation of unforgeable and
cryptographically strong message digests or digital signatures.
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Each security level in SOR has a corresponding number: 1. This number means
that a message is encrypted and separated into 1 pieces when a node wants to send the
message. The larger 1, the higher level and more security provided. For instance, 1 can be
related to the rank in the army. The smallest value of 1 is one, corresponding to the lowest
security level. That means the single path routing as it is in an ordinary routing protocol.
Because an on-demand routing protocol can find multi-path routes, a sender needs to
compare route reply messages in order to choose 1 shortest path routes to send a message.
That is, after confirming that there are 1 possible routes, the sender can use these routes to
forward the encrypted messages to the destination. This process continues until some
routes are broken. If n paths are disconnected, the sender needs to find n instead of 1 new
paths. The research economizes ad hoc network resources by giving different-security-
level nodes different ability to transmit, especially in a scheme where only a few high-
security-level nodes exist among all the nodes. Such scheme is common when one
constructs an ad hoc network. Suppose that 80% mobile nodes belong to the lowest
security level. The routings between them acts as single path routing. Therefore, network
performance keeps unchanged if one considers these nodes only. Even if the throughput
and delay varies after considering high security level nodes, it is predicted that the
network overload may not be significantly larger because only 20% nodes need multipath
routing. The performance between single path and proposed multipath scheme will be
compared later.
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3.3.1 Security Level Implementation
Because of the advantage of finding multipaths in ad hoc on-demand routing protocol,
SOR is built as an augmentation to the AODV. The researcher retains the most of
AODV's original behavior, such as on-demand route discovery using flooding, and
reverse path maintenance in intermediate nodes. The route table entry is modified to carry
additional multipath information. Table 3.0 gives a comparison of the structure of routing
table entries of AODV and SOR.
In SOR, the notion of nexthop is extended to a nexthop array that defines multiple
next hops with respective routes. For instance, considering a source node numbered 0,
nexthop[0] equals 2 means in the 0 th route to a certain destination, the nexthop that node
0 should forward the packet is node 2; nexthop[0] equals 4 means that the nexthop is
45
node 4 in the 0 st route. However, all next hops still have the same destination address and
destination sequence number.
A new notion of "security level" is added to each node's routing table entry.
Security level is set only once during the initialization and does not change during the
process.
When node i wants to communicate with node j, it needs to decide first how many
paths it should use, abiding the following rule:
where
1, a is the actual number of paths that node i uses
1; ,and la are the security levels of node i and node j, respectively
Equation (3.00) shows that when two nodes with different security levels want to
communicate with each other, the number of paths that they use is determined by the
nodes with lower security level. This situation is determined by the cryptological analysis
ability of one node. Usually lower security level nodes are assigned low-end devices with
lower computational ability. Hence these nodes need more time to do the encryption and
decryption than higher-level nodes do. It is assumed that the information exchanged
between higher and lower level nodes is less important than the information exchanged
between two nodes with the same higher level. Hence, the former's protection can be
relatively lower than the latters.
A node-disjoint route is used to secure a message when finding the multipath for
one connection. A disjoint route includes node-disjoint and link-disjoint routes. Node-
disjoint route means that common nodes are strictly prohibited during routing, except the
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source and destination. In contrast, link-disjoint routes do not have any common link.
Note that link-disjoint may have common nodes. Node-disjoint restriction presents a
smaller number of disjoint routes. This makes node-disjoint less effective. On the other
hand, from the security point of view, a link-disjoint route is considered more risky than
node-disjoint route since common nodes may be compromised.
In the original AODV, any node discards the RREQ packet if it has already
received it, including the destination that a message will finally reach. In SOR, this rule is
still effective for intermediate nodes. But for the destination, it sends RREP regarding
each RREQ packet it has received and updates its route table entry for different routes.
One additional field named "pathno_no" is added to the RREP. This item indicates the itch
path that the destination has received. pathno_no is started counting from zero. Similarly,
any nodes in the RREP back route updates their route table using the pathno_no
including in the RREP packet. For instance, if source node 0 receives a RREP packet
including pathno_no 0 from node 4, it updates its route table entry with nexthop[1]
equaling 4. For intermediate node that has the latest known route to the destination, it
discards the same RREQ packet because of the node-disjoint restriction.
3.3.2 Implementation for Hopcount Restriction
The AODV's RREQ parameter is modified with a new notion of "maximum hopcount".
The maximum hopcount of a source node to a destination represents the "maximum"
hopcount that a single path can traverse. For instance, maximum hopcount four means
that a source node needs to find a path within four hopcounts, that is, this path's
maximum number of intermediate nodes is three. When a node receives RREQ, it follows
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the normal procedure that AODV has defined. Only when it decides to forward this
packet, it checks the RREQ's hopcount to make sure that the hopcount is smaller than the
maximum hopcount. If the hopcount has exceeded the threshold, this RREQ packet is
discarded. Note that this process is performed after the increase of the hopcount and
before a forward operation.
The maximum hopcount is specified when a node initializes its RREQ packet, and
remains unchanged until time out. If it cannot find a path to the destination, which means
either it needs higher hopcount or the packet has been congested because of the limited
bandwidth or buffer of wireless resources, it automatically increases its maximum
hopcount by one and sends a new RREQ as described in AODV. This step increases the
probability to find a new path and guarantees the same final result as original AODV can
obtain. There is no upper limit to this maximum hopcount increase. Note that the increase
of the maximum hopcount does not directly mean the increase of routing packets.
Suppose that an isolated node wants to communicate with others. The distance between it
and the nearest node is greater than d. No matter what the maximum hopcount it has, the
total number of routing packets between it and others remains unchanged. In some cases,
one node's maximum hopcount increase consumes additional resources and energy
considering this node only. But after evaluating the whole ad hoc network, network
resources are still saved by restricting the hopcount.
3.3.3 Implementation of SOR
Figure 3.6 is the flow chart of SOR for a specific node i. After node i chooses initial
security level, it sets its routing table entry. Routing table entry is for one node only. For
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each destination, node I creates a routing table entry. RREQ packet is set after node i
chooses initial maximum hopcount. Note when node i needs to send RREQ again because
of the link broken, it has to use initial maximum hopcount instead of currently used
maximum hopcount to set RREQ.
Figure 3.6 Implementation of SOR.
3.4 Simulation
A detailed simulation model is used based on the latest ns2. In the experiment, random
waypoint model is used to simulate random node mobility model. Maximum speed of a
node varies from 0 m/s to 20m/s to reflect different mobility. An ad hoc network in a
field with dimensions 670m x 670m and 1500m x 300m is used. The number of nodes
varies from 10 to 60. Traffic sources are CBR, i.e., continuous bit-rate. The source-
destination pairs are spread randomly throughout the network. Only 512 byte data
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packets are used. The packet rate at the source nodes is 4 packets/sec. The number of
sessions increases along with the increase of the number of nodes. All traffic sessions are
established at random times and stay active until the end. Simulations are run for 300
simulated seconds. Each data point in the following figures is the average results. Similar
simulation environment has been used before in several recent performance studies on ad
hoc networks [Marina and Das, 2001; Broch et al., 1998; Perkins et al., 2001].
The security level and hopcount restriction are combined together into SOR.
Security level is set to two for simplicity. level-li and Level-lh represent the level of high
security level nodes and the level of low security level nodes, respectively. level-li
equals 2 and 10% nodes belong to this level, which means they need to find two separate
paths and transmit split CBR using two paths separately when they talk with each other.
Level-ll equals 1 and 90% nodes belong to this level. Their sessions between level-lh and
level-li act as in a single path routing. The following parameters are considered that has
been defined in Chapter 2: (1) routing load — the number of routing packets for each
session; (2) packet delivery fraction — ratio of the data packets delivered successfully to
the destination to those generated by the CBR sources; and (3) average end-to-end delay
of data packets — this includes all possible delays caused by buffering during route
discovery, queuing delay at the interface, propagation and transfer times, and
retransmission delays at the MAC layer.
Routing load can be acquired by the total number of routing packets divided by
total number of sessions. Note that much more routing packets are needed when nodes
move. When two paths are used to send one packet, this packet is delivered successfully
after the destination receives two pieces together. The result of SOR is an integrated
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result of the multipath and hopcount restriction. This work uses packet delivery fraction
and average delay to evaluate the multipath performance of SOR.
3.4.1 Normal Security Level Simulation
Figure 3.7 shows the routing load as a function of nodes in a 670m x 670m area.
Maximum hopcount is set to three based on (3.9). A source node needs approximately
100 routing packets to find a route in a 10 node network; while in a 50 node network, it
needs 900 routing packets to accomplish the same connection. There is no doubt that
routing load increases along with the number of nodes due to the flooding property of on-
demand routing protocol. Performance of SOR and AODV are similar in the sparse node
density case. Their performance becomes apparently different at more node cases. As
expected, SOR generates fewer routing load than AODV (10%-30%) when most
connections are successful. Figure 3.8 shows the routing load as a function of nodes in a
1500m x 300m area. Maximum hopcount is set to six. The work does not simulate 10
node case in Figure 3.8 because most sources cannot find destinations in a wide area
owing to this small number of nodes. For the large area, the results similar to the small
area's are obtained as shown in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.9 studies the packet delivery fraction as a function of nodes in a
670m x 670m area with the maximum speed 10m/s. A desirable result is obtained when
20 nodes move. It has a sharp drop when the number of nodes varies from forty to fifty.
This is because excess crowd increases the routing load and the network is already under
saturation (over 40% packets are dropped by both protocols). At each point, SOR has a
slightly higher packet delivery fraction than AODV has although some of SOR routes
need more paths. This is mainly because SOR reduces more routing load than AODV.
52
Figure 3.10 shows the average end-to-end delay in a 670m x 670m area measured
in seconds. The maximum speed remains the same as 10m/s. Average delay reaches an
unacceptable high value while 40 or 50 nodes are in this area. This is because useless
routing packets waste a large portion of network resources. SOR has a tremendous
reduction comparing to AODV (around 50%) in high density nodes network. Besides the
contribution of hopcount restriction, multipath in SOR can also reduce the average delay
because it requires less bandwidth in a link between two nodes.
3.4.2 Internal Enemy Attack Simulation
In order to check the impact of multipath to ad hoc network, a "hypothetical" enemy is
simulated inside the network. It compromises an individual node randomly and
eavesdrops or blocks any packets, including routing packets and data packets, which go
through this node. The difference between eavesdropping and blocking is that
eavesdropping does not impact the normal data transmission of the whole network.
Eavesdropping only analyzes the packets that pass through the compromised node.
Blocking packets means that no packets can pass this node, which results in error
message sending from its neighborhood. The action of blocking can significantly reduce
the performance, but the routing protocol can detect a compromised node and find new
routes that pass by it. Thus, information will not be leaked out after a short time.
A simplified threshold cryptography [Desmedt, 19941 is used to keep the
information safe. In an (n, t+1) threshold cryptography scheme, a data packet is divided
into n pieces. In correspondence with such a scheme, SOR needs to find n paths for
multipath transmission. After any t+1 pieces arrive at the destination node, one data
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packet is assumed to transmit successfully. It is infeasible to recover the whole data
packet for up to t pieces, i.e., it is impractical if only t nodes attack this scheme
corporately. There is a slight modification of previous SOR at the time when a source
node begins to find a new path. As long as t+/ paths are valid, the source node does not
need to find a new path. In other words, the source node discards the error message sent
from an intermediate node. Only if a destination node sends an error message to the
source node, a new-path-find process begins. The difference between multipath routing
and the proposed method is 1) multipath routing does not classify the mobile nodes and 2)
it gives every node the same bandwidth to transmit messages. Ad hoc network resources
are saved by giving different security-level nodes different ability to transmit, especially
in a scheme where only a few high security level nodes exist among all the nodes.
A simplified (3, 2) threshold cryptography scheme is simulated in SOR. Level-lh
equals three and one assigns 20% nodes to this level. If a compromised node can
eavesdrop or block any two pieces of a Level-ll packet, this route is considered being
compromised. Level-li equals one. All packets going through a compromised node are
considered unprotected. The effect of blocking or eavesdropping is discussed below
separately.
Routing load with 670m x 670m under the effect of blocking is shown in Figure
3.11. Comparing to Figure 3.7, the routing load has a distinct increase at each point. A
source node needs 2-3 times more routing packets to find a route than Figure 3.7's. This
is mainly because a compromised node makes route unavailable frequently. SOR
significantly reduces routing packets by multipath routing compared with AODV. Most
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of the level-l paths are kept available when one path is compromised. The more level-l
nodes participate in the network, the more routing load SOR reduces.
Figure 3.12 shows the ratio of leaking packets to those generated by the CBR
sources with 670m x 670m under the effect of eavesdropping. Note that one compromised
path does not imply any leaking packets because of the implementation of the security
level. Leakage happens when two paths are compromised for level-l. For level-l/
destination nodes, one path is compromised is defined as a leakage. The work does not
allow level-l nodes to be the majority of all nodes because it violates the assumption in
Section 2. When the proportion of level-l nodes varies from 20% to 40%, one can keep
over 80% information safe. Comparing to over 30% of leaking packets in the original
AODV, the proposed scheme is effective against the attack of eavesdropping. If there are
too many level-l nodes inside the network, the proportion of leaking packets begins to
rise. This is because more level-l nodes need more intermediate nodes to participate in
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the transmission, especially when level-lh nodes need to find three paths. Thus, the
probability that their messages go through the compromised nodes rises as well. Figure
3.12 illustrates that maximum security is achieved when the proportion of high security
nodes is around 40%.
3.5 Summary
Dividing the traffic into multiple routes helps distribute the load to the network hosts.
Multipath routing can also be used in on-demand protocols to achieve security. This
chapter analyzes the security of ad hoc routing algorithm with regard to the protection
associated with the transmission of routing messages, proposes a performance enhanced
secure ad hoc on-demand routing protocol (SOR) embedded with "Security Level"
concept, and uses "maximum hopcount" to restrict the number of routing packets in a
given area.
The proposed scheme provides customizable security to the flow of routing
protocol messages themselves. The work has studied the performance of SOR relative to
AODV under a wide range of traffic scenarios. SOR offers a significant reduction in
average packet delay and provides up to about 30% reduction in routing load. A
"hypothetical" enemy is constructed that can compromise nodes inside the network.
Through these compromised nodes the advantage of SOR over AODV is investigated in
the aspect of security. In general, SOR offers an alternative way to implement better
security in on-demand routing protocol.
CHAPTER 4
MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF AD HOC NETWORK
WITH STOCHASTIC PETRI NETS
4.1 Introduction
In order to analyze the performance of ad hoc networks such as average delay, data
throughput, and packet delivery fraction, a large quantity of research work has been done.
New ad hoc routing protocols are proposed and the existing ones are compared against
each other. However, only few papers address the network architecture as a whole traffic
model. In particular, more investigations are needed in forming the actual environment in
which the protocols are expected to operate. Ad hoc network is too complex to allow
analytical study for explicit performance expressions. One of the widely used approaches
is using simulation methods. However, there are two main drawbacks in using such
methods: First, they may be time consuming to execute the necessary simulations.
Imaging in a highly variable scenario, with the number of nodes ranging from tens to
thousands, node mobility varying from zero to tens of m/s, the simulation time of most
current systems will increase dramatically to an unacceptable level. Second, it may be
difficult to achieve results that are precise enough. In order to get a reliable value, one has
to run simulation tens of iterations with different seed values of a random generator.
Petri Nets (PN) [Zhou and Venkatech, 1999] is a graphical and mathematical
modeling tool. They are widely used to model and analyze such discrete event systems as
communication, manufacturing, and transportation systems. Petri nets are excellent tools
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to model and analyze a system that exhibits such features as parallelism, synchronism,
and conflicting events.
tokens in the itch place.
The advantages of applying a PN formalism to ad hoc network system
performance analysis are summarized as follows:
1) PN's graphical nature allows one to visualize the structure of an ad hoc network
system and make the models relatively simple and legible, and
2) PN's mathematical foundation allows one to express the dynamic behavior of a
system in algebraic forms.
This work intends to present an approach to the modeling and analysis of large-
scale ad hoc network systems using Petri nets. There are two requirements to effectively
represent network features. First, a model should be detailed enough to describe some
important network characteristics that have a significant impact on performance. Second,
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it should be simple enough to be scalable and analyzable. Our goal is to build up a
generalized model dealing with different environments. If a probability distribution
function is associated to the transition, and random distribution function time delay to the
firing time of each transition, the resulting net class is called Stochastic Petri net (SPN)
[Ajmone-Marsan et al., 1984]. SPNP is used to build an approximate model for a quick
numerical analysis of network performance. SPN consists of places and transitions as
well as a number of functions. Enabled transitions fire according to their exponentially
distributed time delay. The exponential distribution is required in order to derive a
Markov process from SPN. It allows the quick construction of a simplified abstract model
that is numerically solved for different model parameters. Besides exponential
distribution, SPN allows us to try several other distributions, such as Erlang and
deterministic distributions, to analyze the performance under different situations. SPN
provides a framework for modeling, simulation, verification, and formal analysis of
designed systems. This is very important in ad hoc network design.
Due to the advantage in the quick construction and numerical analysis of SPN,
several related works have been done to investigate the characteristics of communication
networks. Xiong et al. (2002) modeled and simulated ad hoc routing protocol using
colored Petri Nets (CPN). They used a topology approximation mechanism to solve the
problem of topology changes, which is an inherent feature of ad hoc networks. Ciardo et
al. (1995) modeled a scalable high speed interconnect, which is continuous hexagonal
mesh like wired network, with stochastic Petri Nets. They presented both exact and
tractable approximate SPN model and compared it with simulation results based on CPN.
Their work can only be applied to a specific network, however, Chen et al. (2001)
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developed a stochastic reward nets to analyze call admission control. They incorporated
handoff call dropout time information into the decision policy. Trivedi et al. (2000)
introduced some recent research on SPN including stochastic reward nets, fluid stochastic
Petri nets, and so on. They can be widely used in ATM networks, Ethernet Bridge, and
RF recovery in wireless communication. However, none of above researches addresses
on the overall performance of ad hoc networks, which is addressed in the following
sections.
The remaining chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a stochastic
Petri net model to represent an ad hoc network. Section 4.3 compares the numerical
results of the proposed SPN model with simulation results. Section 4.4 gives the
summary.
Using SPN to model network is not novel. Figure 4.1 represents a finite buffer
M/M/m/b queue in SPN, where m is the number of servers and b is the capacity of the
queue. Transition train represents the arrival of a customer with firing rate 2. An inhibitor
arc with multiplicity b from place buf to train represents the capacity of the queuing
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system. Transition trip is disabled when the number of tokens in the buf equals or is
greater than b. The transition rate of trsery is defined as:
where #(buf) represents the number of tokens in place buf.
From Figure 4.1, one can easily calculate the network performance parameter as:
Throughput = grate(trser)]
Average Aueue length = EP1(buf)]
where E[] means the steady-state average throughput.
However, this model is far from enough to describe a real ad hoc network. It
cannot describe the operation of routing protocols; and a complicated system with
different transition rates cannot be illustrated.
Figure 4.2 illustrates a simple ad hoc network's packet flow with three nodes.
Each node has a finite buffer that can hold w packets. When packets arrive or are
generated, it can either enter the waiting buffer or be discarded immediately because of
the full buffer. Dashed lines between two nodes mean wireless connections. A packet is
being transmitted successfully between nodes 1 and 2. Because node 3 is moving away
from node 1, their connection is broken. Therefore, any packets being transmitting are
lost. Considering the dynamic topology of an ad hoc network, packet loss may happen
frequently.
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When an ad hoc network is modeled, one cannot construct such structure by
placing nodes into it one by one. Its size will expand too large for an exact numerical
solution. This research would rather describe an approximate model based on the idea of
SPN decomposition [Ciardo and Trivedi, 1993]. This approximate model exploits a large
number of nodes and essentially describes the behavior of one node under a workload
that is generated by the whole ad hoc network. Thus the basic idea is to approximate and
generate a proper amount of traffic going through one node in a network of a particular
size. A fixed-point iteration scheme is used to derive results.
An approximate SPN model is constructed from outgoing and incoming subnets
representing different node activities from the perspective of a single node. The former
models the packets that are transmitted from the current node to another node. The latter
models the current node that is dealing with packets from outside.
4.2.2 Outgoing Subnet Model
The outgoing subnet is shown in Figure 4.3. Subscript o and i are used to represent
outgoing and incoming, respectively. Transition Ao generates the packets at a given rate
and puts them into place WBo. An inhibitor arc with cardinality Co from WBo to Ao is
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needed to ensure that the number of packets waiting to enter the current node is finite and
bounded by Co.
Place Buffer contains tokens corresponding to free buffer spaces inside the current
node. Buffer is shared by incoming and outgoing packets. The initial number of tokens is
the total number of buffer spaces in a node. The immediate transition GBo reserves a
buffer space for outgoing packets and puts it into place RBo.
After a token arrives in place RBo, two possibilities are
1. Because of the shortage of buffer spaces, physical failure during transmission,
rapid movement of mobile nodes, or predefined timeout during waiting, the token
(message) is dropped out from the network and discarded. Since the work is using
one node to represent the whole network, this process can happen at any time
during transmission, for instance, when packets are in the source node, destination
node or intermediate node's buffer. When immediate transition DPYo fires, the
token is moved to place RDo; and
2. Nothing happens to the token. It still remains in the buffer. When transition DPNo
fires, the token is forwarded to place RTo.
The probability, denotes by a, that a token remains in the buffer without being
dropped depends upon the size of an ad hoc network, buffer capacity, node density
distribution, transmission rate of packets, and node mobility. a is a variable in the SPN
model. Once a is assigned to DPNo, The probability for DPYo is 1-a.
Timed transition DFo represents the completion of the dropping, after which one
buffer in the current node is released by returning a token to place Buffer. Timed
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transition TFo means that packets are successfully transmitted to another node and a
token is released to Buffer.
4.2.3 Incoming Subnet Model
Incoming subnet is shown in Figure 4.4. Transition Ai generates the packets ready to be
sent by neighbor nodes to the current node and put the packets into place WB1. An
inhibitor arc with cardinality C1 from WBi to Ai is still needed. After getting a buffer from
shared place Buffer, transition GBi fires, and the token is transferred to place IBi. A token
in place IBi, representing a packet received by the current node from its neighbors, is
either destined to the current node, or has to be forwarded to other nodes.
1. If the packet has to be forwarded, immediate transition Te moves the token to
place RBo, which means that the incoming packet becomes an outgoing one for
the current node. It must be pointed out that a packet generated from A1 also has
the possibility to be dropped out throughout the transmission. Thus, the incoming
packet going through transition Te consequently goes through DPNo or DPYo.
2. If the packet's destination is the current node, immediate transition Ti moves the
token to place RR1. Transition RF1 represents the completion of receiving packets.
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After its firing, one buffer in the current node is released by returning a token to
place Buffer.
Once the SPN models are built up, the next question is to determine the
parameters needed in the SPN model. The probability that a packet is forwarded or
received by current node involves an approximation of transmission length. According to
[Li et al., 2001] and [Gupta and Kumar, 2000], when the node density is constant, the
probability density function (pdf), which means the probability of one node
communicating with another node at distance x, is given by
Suppose that the nominal radio range for a wireless LAN is d. One has the
average number of hops n required to send a packet from source to destination.
Hence, a fraction 1/n of the incoming packets is directed to the current node. Note
that n is a variable depending on the variation of the network area.
After the average number of hops is determined, the firing rate of transition A1 can
be easily derived by the product of the outgoing rate X and the average hop number n,
since the packet is delivered into neighbor nodes for each hop it takes.
4.2.4 Overall SPN Model
The composite SPN model is shown in Figure 4.5 resulting from a combination of
outgoing and incoming subnets by merging shared places, RBo and Buffer. The meaning
of the places and transitions in SPN is summarized in Table 4.1. The firing rate and
probabilities of the transitions are given in Table 4.2. #(p) is defined as the number of
tokens in place p. The priority of transitions depends on the definition. Higher priority is
represented by a larger number. It is illustrated that GBi's priority is higher than GBo' s to
ensure that the delivery of packets in transmission takes priority over the injection of new
packets into the network.
The undefined parameter in Table 4.2 is x, the average time required by an
outgoing packet to obtain and fill a buffer in the next node on its path. This process refers
to one hop only. By summery, this work follows the rule that x has the same average as
the time that a packet in place WB1 must wait before it can obtain a local buffer slot and
enter place IBi.
Hence, the following fixed-point iteration scheme is set up:
(1) Choose an initial guess x(0) for x;
(2) Compute the successive values of x as:
where w is the average waiting time and is obtained by using Little's Law:
Table 4.1 Meaning of Places and Transitions in the SPN Model
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4.3 Numerical Results and Comparison
4.3.1 Network Parameter Setting
The average per flow throughput can be defined as the number of packets received by
the destinations divided by the number of connections, and average packet delay T.
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Because network overall throughput is affected by many factors, there's no uniform
metrics for ad hoc networks. In the proposed model, 4- can be calculated as:
Rate(Ao) is not a constant despite that its firing rate is defined. Its value changes
within each iteration. r is defined as the average time elapsing from the instant a packet is
generated by its source node (firing of transition Ao), to the instant it is read by its
destination node (firing of transition RF1). In the model of Figure 4.5, this is obtained as
the sum of three components:
(1) The average time a packet waits before it is put into a buffer in the current node. It
is computed using Little's law:
(2) The average time a packet waits before it is removed from the buffer in the
destination node:
(3)	 The average time a packet passes through intermediate nodes. It equals the
product of transmission time x and average number of hop n:
A parameter named delivery ratio is defined, which is a in SPN model. a refers to
the packet delivery fraction in performance metrics of an ad hoc network.
A detailed simulation model based on the latest ns2 version is also used to
establish the believability of the proposed SPN mehtod. The research adopts AODV and
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DSR protocols to deal with a routing problem. Both are on-demand protocols. The
detailed description of two protocols is in Chapter 2.
In the experiment, a random waypoint model is used to generate a node mobility
model. 802.11 for wireless LANs is used as a shared-media radio with a nominal bit-rate
of 2 Mb/sec and a nominal radio range of 250 meters. An ad hoc network in two fields
with dimensions 670m x 670m and 1000m x 1000m is used. Thus, from Eq. (4.1), n is
2.5 and 3.77, respectively in the experiment. fi  can be derived from n. One cannot use a
fraction in simulation because none of the packets can be divided into several parts.
Fraction can be used in an analytical model to describe the proposed SPN model more
accurately.
The proposed fixed-point scheme converged only in a few iterations. Conditions
for the existence of a fixed point may be found in [Mainkar and Trivedi, 1996]. The proof
of a unique solution is considered as a harder problem that will be addressed in the future
research. Comparing to the time consuming simulation, the fixed-point scheme's cost is
negligible.
The traffic sources are CBR, i.e., constant bit rate. CBRIUDP (User Datagram
Protocol) traffic flows are used as data packets during the performance analysis process
instead of TCP traffic because of the TCP's poor performance in ad hoc networks. The
performance of TCP in ad hoc networks can be seen in [Ganes and Vlahovic, 2002;
Holland and Vaidya, 1999; Sun and Man, 2001]. Figure 4.6 shows the TCP connection in
simulation. The delivery ratio of typical TCP connection is either very high around 0.9,
or very low, nearly zero. This is because TCP intends to provide a reliable connection
and has been optimized for fixed networks. Due to the high node mobility, an ad hoc
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network topology changes continuously. Current TCP implementations cannot guarantee
a stable performance because they lack the ability to distinguish packet losses caused by
network congestions or route failures. Because the intercurrent status of TCP are unable
to be well studied, CBR traffic is used.
Figure 4.6 TCP delivery ratio.
There are 30 nodes roaming in this area with zero pause time (constant mobility).
The speed of a node varies from 0 m/s to 20m/s to change mobility. The source-
destination pairs are spread randomly throughout the network. Only 512 byte data
packets are used. The number of sessions increases along with the number of nodes. All
traffic sessions are established at random times and stay active until the end. Similar
simulation environment was used before in several recent performance studies on ad hoc
networks [Brock et al., 1998; Perkins et al., 2001]. However, most of the simulations
before this work keep a relative low traffic to maintain a high successful packet delivery
ratio. For instance, the packet rate varies between 2 and 4 packets/s [Perkins et al., 2001],
and up to 8 packets/s [Broach et al., 1998]. In order to explore the throughput and latency
in low delivery ratio situation, more than 10 packets are generated and transmitted in one
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second in this simulation. Broch (1998) and Perkins (2001) evaluated routing protocols
under different pause time, that is, nodes stay motionless until pause time. In SPN, the
node is keep moving constantly from very beginning because continuous moving reflects
more accurately the high mobility. Note that the high mobility is a basic characteristic of
an ad hoc network.
The delivery ratio in SPN can be specified. Note that this value can be acquired
only from statistics and calculation in simulation. Hence the delivery ratio value from
SPN has a small difference compared with the data from ns2.
4.3.2 Result Comparison
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the result of average per flow throughput as a function of
delivery ratio a under two different fields, respectively. It is shown that a close match
exists between the obtained results and those from a simulation model in ns2. The
maximum error between SPN and two routing protocols is below 9% for both fields. The
SPN model well represents the per flow throughput varying with delivery ratio. These
two figures show that no matter what routing protocol is using, their per flow throughput
keeps a linear relationship with delivery ratio. There is no noted difference between two
different protocols. The experiment shows that even packet drop probability is low,
which means most generated packets can arrive at their destinations successfully, the
system throughput, usually under 0.05Mb/s, is surprisingly low compared to the channel
capacity 2Mb/sec. This result is concurrent with the research results in [Li et al., 2001]. If
one wants to improve network performance by increasing the sending rate of per flow,
delivery ratio drops quickly.
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Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show the latency varying with a. Delay time becomes longer
as the number of drop packets increases. Latency becomes quite high if a is less than 0.6
that is unacceptable. There's a difference between two protocols because they use
different schemes to deal with latency. The overhead of DSR is potentially larger than
that of AODV since each DSR packet have to carry full routing information, whereas in
AODV packets need only contain the destination address. Similar settings apply to route
reply and memory overhead. Furthermore, DSR is not scalable to large networks.
Combining these features, the AODV's overall performance is better than DSR's. When
delivery ratio is larger than 0.5, SPN shows a good match to the simulation results. The
maximum error is below 6%. When delivery ratio is smaller than 0.5, the proposed
model's maximum error with actual protocols becomes high. At few points, like 0.4 in
abscissa, error can be 20%. This is because the latency is too high to be acquired accurate
and believable. It is a reference value since no application allows such high drop packet
rate. However, the model shows the basic varying trend of the relationship between
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latency and delivery ratio that exists in both protocols. When delivery ratio decreases,
Latency's increase behaves like a parabola rather than linear increase. The proposed
model can be improved to obtain a more accurate solution to represent this parameter.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, a stochastic Petri net model is developed to represent an ad hoc network.
The proposed scheme provides a customizable approach to analyze the characteristics
and performance of the system. It is shown that a close match exists between the obtained
results and those from a simulation model in ns2. The proposed scheme costs negligible
computational effort compared with that of a simulation method. While SPN model can
give a theoretical solution for ad hoc network, ns2 is only used as a detailed model.
Because ns2 has become a standard simulation tool in network research, the comparison
gives us a link between Petri nets and detailed discrete event systems.
Some characteristics can be obtained by SPN with slight modification of the
proposed model. All of the time delays attached with transitions in the proposed model
are approximated with exponential distributions. This is not always true in a real system.
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For instance, sometimes delays are constants. One can apply Erlang distributions with a
given mean in the SPN model to approximate the constant distribution. That increases the
computation complexity but can improve the model with better practicability.
Currently, the proposed SPN model cannot reflect a specific routing protocol's
characteristics. Thus, it is a generalized model. In order to better analyze the routing
protocols under different situation, additional places and transitions must be considered to
represent those parameters. Such changes shall make the model more applicable.
Network security is an important issue in the current ad hoc network research.
Several aspects have been stressed including routing protocols, authentication, access
control, quality of service (QoS), etc. The next chapter models the "Security Level"
concept in Chapter 3 into Petri nets to analyze corresponding ad hoc network's changes
and performance.
CHAPTER 5
STOCHASTIC PETRI NET MODELING OF SECURITY
In Chapters 3 and 4, the performance enhanced secure ad hoc on-demand routing
protocol (SOR) and stochastic Petri nets model of ad hoc network are proposed to
analyze the network performance. SPN model has been proved to well represent the
characteristic of an ad hoc network. This chapter wants to analyze the SOR's
performance, especially the security performance, by analytical SPN model.
In order to embed "Security Level" model in SPN, multiplicity of an arc of PN is
used to represent multipath selection. An arc with multiplicity i from place to transition
means that, to fire the transition, at least i tokens are needed in the place. An arc with
multiplicity i from transition to place means that, after firing the transition, there are i
tokens going into the place. The use of arc multiplicity in PN can well represent the
"Security Level" concept. In Figure 3.1, the process of node A dividing and transferring
messages to neighbor nodes 1, 2, and 3 can be illustrated by a arc with multiplicity three
from a place to a transition. After firing the transition, three tokens are moved to next
place in the SPN model. The process of node B integrating messages PS(m, sib) and PS(m,
s3) can be illustrated by a arc with multiplicity two from transition to place. Two tokens
are needed to fire the transition.
Consider measuring security criteria in SPN model. One cannot assign random
number in SPN model as we did in Chapter 3, which means the attack frequency of a
compromised node must be determined before SPN simulation begins. At the same time,
attack frequency, proportion and communication frequency of different security levels
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can be viewed as a variant of SPN model, as delivery ratio a in Chapter 4, to explore the
relationship between attack effects and security levels.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 adds multipath
parameter into the SPN model. Section 5.2 integrates security measurement into the
scheme. Section 5.3 compares the numerical results of the modified SPN model with
simulation results. Section 5.4 gives the summary.
5.1 Multipath Parameter
In order to incorporate the multipath characteristic into the previous proposed stochastic
Petri net model and analyze the SOR's effect on ad hoc network, Chapter 4's SPN model
is modified as follows.
Figure 5.1 SPN multipath outgoing part model.
Multipath parameter adding means the "Security Level" concept's
implementation in SPN. Figure 5.1 represents a multipath outgoing part model derived
from Figure 4.3. Suppose that there are n security levels in an ad hoc network. Each
security level i in SOR has a corresponding number 1„ which means there are 1, paths for
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each level. After firing the timed transition TFi, 1, tokens are moved from place RTo to
place Buffer. Such process can be defined as:
where 0(L, t) is defined as the multiplicity of a directed arc from transition t to place L in
Chapter 4.
After defining the proportion of each security-level node in ad hoc network and
packet rates of different level nodes, the probability that fires the transition SP0k is
defined as:
where r, is the proportion of each security level and 2, is the packet arrival rates of
different levels. The summary of all Lk  should equal one.
A two-level multipath outgoing subnet sample is shown in Figure 5.2. /j is equal
to one and 12 is equal to three. A new place MPo is defined to represent the beginning of
outgoing packet multipath selection. After firing the timed transition TF1 or TF2, one or
three tokens are released to Buffer, respectively. 1, is assigned during the initialization of
the model and cannot been changed in the simulation.
Figure 5.3 SPN multipath incoming part model.
In correspondence with Section 3.4.2, the simplified (3, 2) threshold cryptography
scheme is used to construct the model as an example. Figure 5.3 represents a multipath
incoming part model derived from Figure 4.4. The settings are similar to the outgoing
subnet. Multiplicity arc is defined as:
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where I(L, t) is defined as the multiplicity of a directed arc from place L to transition t in
Chapter 4.
lib  -1 means that, to fire timed transition RF1, at least 1, -1 tokens are required to be
in place RR1 if 1 is greater than one. The physical meaning of the process from RR1 to
Buffer is that, one data packet is assumed to transmit successfully after any 1, -1 pieces
arrive at the destination node. A new place MP1 is defined to represent the beginning of
incoming packet multipath selection. The probability that fires the transition Pik is
obtained as:
where Lk is equal to Lk in Equation (5.1).
A two-level multipath incoming subnet sample, corresponding to Figure 5.2, is
shown in Figure 5.4. One or two tokens are needed to fire timed transition RFI or RF2,
respectively.
Figure 5.4 SPN 2-level multipath incoming subnet.
The modified SPN model incorporated with outgoing and incoming subnets is
shown in Figure 5.5. The meaning of places and transitions is summarized in the next
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section. In order to maintain the balance of tokens, some additional places, which are
irrelevant to the underlying network, need to be added during the simulation. However,
this current model does not simulate the detailed situations including several broken paths.
It rather considers the ad hoc network under an ideal running condition, i.e., no broken
path. This is one limitation of this model.
5.2 Security Measurement
As done in Chapter 3, a "hypothetical" enemy is constructed. The enemy node can be
inserted either in the outgoing subnet or incoming subnet. For simplicity, the
compromised node is placed in the incoming subnet.
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Figure 5.6 shows the SPN incoming part model with a compromised node. Only
eavesdropping is considered because blocking has a less potential effect than
eavesdropping on leaking packets, which was analyzed in Chapter 3. Suppose that the
hypothetical enemy can eavesdrop a certain portion packets of ad hoc network through
various nodes during the simulation, no matter the security level. When an incoming
packet arrives at place MPi, it either enters the regular multipath selection, or is
eavesdropped by a compromised node. Transition CE1 moves a token to a compromised
node place CN. The probability, denoted by w, that a token enters transition CE1 is a
variable in SPN model. Corresponding to CEi, Equation (5.2) has to be modified as:
Figure 5.6 SPN incoming part model with compromised node.
Tokens in place CN do not mean that the packet information has been leaked out.
For the itch level security node, information is leaked out only if there are / i-1 places in RCi
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to fire transition CFi. Thus, the rule of token flow after place CN is similar to that of
Figure 5.3, where
Figure 5.7 Overall SPN model.
The overall SPN model incorporated with multipath selection and security
measurement is shown in Figure 5.7. The firing rate and probabilities of the transitions
are given in Table 5.1. The meaning of the places and transitions in SPN is summarized
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in Table 5.2. Some places and transitions can be merged together. For the purpose of the
physical meaning, they keep unchanged.
The fixed-point iteration is the same as in Chapter 4.2.4 because the entrance of
SPN model is not changed.
Table 5.2 Meaning of Places and Transitions in Figure 5.7
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5.3 Simulation and Comparison
There are five parameters in the SPN model, a fibw, r,andA.First, multipath
performance is studied. co is set to zero to eliminate the effect of any compromised node.
The setting of ns2 for SOR is similar to those in Chapter 3. An ad hoc network with
dimension 670m x 670m is used. /3 is 0.4 from Table 5.2. There are 30 nodes roaming in
this area with zero pause time (constant mobility). The speed of a node varies from 0 m/s
to 20m/s to change mobility. The source-destination pairs are spread randomly
throughout the network. The traffic sources are CBR. Only 512 byte data packets are
used. The security level setting is the same as that in Figure 5.7. A is a constant for
different security level for simplicity. The average packet delay ti is calculated almost the
same as Equation (4.2), in which (4.4) should be modified as:
In Figure 5.8, average packet delay i varies as a function of proportion of the 1 st
security level r1. Since we only have two security levels, r2 is equal to 1-r1. rI equals 1.0
means that all of the nodes in ad hoc network belong to the first security level.
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Delay time does not increase along with the increase of the proportion of the 1 st
security level nodes. SPN model shows the consistency with the simulation result of
SOR. The difference between SPN and SOR is below 8%. Figure 5.8 proves from
another aspect that, the proposed multipath routing model can significantly reduce the
latency, comparing to that in Figure 3.10.
Consider the internal enemy attack condition. Since firing transition CF1 means
that a packet has been leaked out by a compromised node, the proportion of leaking
packets shown in the SPN model can be calculated as:
Figure 5.9 shows the ratio of leaking packets to those generated by the CBR. The
proportion of the 2 nd security level is adopted corresponding to Figure 3.12. The data of
SOR is acquired from Chapter 3. It is shown that a close match exists between the SPN
and SOR. The difference between SPN and SOR is below 10%. When the proportion of
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2nd security level nodes varies from 20% to 40%, one can keep over 80% information
safe. Hence, the SPN model proves that SOR is effective against the attack of
eavesdropping.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, the proposed stochastic Petri net model is improved to represent
performance enhanced secure ad hoc on-demand routing protocol (SOR). Security level
and detailed security measurement are embedded into the proposed SPN model as a
parameter. Multipath parameter can be represented by arc multiplicity in Petri nets. This
chapter gives a quantificational measurement to analyze the performance of modified
SPN model under the effect of multipath and attack of a hypothetical compromised node.
Simulation results show that the proposed SPN model well represents the characteristic of
SOR.
The proposed SPN model is an analytical model. It approximates and generates a
proper amount of traffic going through one node in a network of a particular size. It is
difficult to simulate many mobile nodes in a SPN model. Colored Petri Nets is a feasible
alternate tool for future research of ad hoc network.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
6.1 Conclusions
This doctoral dissertation work proposes a performance enhanced Secure ad hoc On-
demand Routing protocol (SOR). It provides a customized stochastic Petri net-based
approach to modeling and analyzing ad hoc networks and their related performance and
security issues.
6.1.1 Summary of Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are summarized into three aspects:
1) Performance enhanced secure ad hoc on demand routing protocol (SOR):
A novel ad hoc on demand routing protocol is proposed. It is embedded with
"Security Level" concept and "maximum hoLcount" to restrict the number of routing
packets in a given area. The proposed scheme provides customizable security to the
flow of routing protocol messages themselves. The performance of SOR relative to
AODV is studied under a wide range of traffic scenarios. SOR offers a significant
reduction in average packet delay and provides up to about 30% reduction in routing
load. In general, SOR offers an alternative way to implement excellent security in an
on-demand routing protocol.
2) Stochastic Petri net Model:
A stochastic Petri net model is proposed to represent an ad hoc network. The
proposed scheme provides a customizable approach to analyze the characteristics and
performance of the system. It is shown that a close match exists between the obtained
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results and those from a simulation model in ns2. The proposed scheme costs
negligible computational effort compared with that of a simulation method. While
SPN model can give a theoretical solution for ad hoc network, ns2 is used to model a
detailed model. Because ns2 has become a standard simulation tool in network
research, the comparison gives us a link between Petri nets and detailed discrete event
systems.
3) Analysis of security improvement:
Based on the previous stochastic Petri nets model, this research improves it to
accommodate SOR characteristics. Security level and detailed security measurement
are embedded into the SPN model as a parameter. Multipath parameter can be
represented by arc multiplicity in Petri nets. This research gives a quantificational
measurement to analyze the performance of the modified SPN model under the effect
of multipath and attack of hypothetical compromised nodes. Simulation results show
that SPN model well represent the characteristic of SOR.
6.1.2 Limitations
This research has the following limitations:
1) In the performance enhanced secure ad hoc on demand routing protocol, the moving
area of mobile nodes is given in advance, which is uncertain in a real environment.
2) In stochastic Petri nets model, all of the time delays attached with transitions in the
proposed model are approximated with exponential distributions. This is not always
true in a real system. For instance, sometimes delays are constants.
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3) In security modeling and analysis, the proportion and communication frequency of
different security level nodes are assumed known and unchanged during the
simulation. This research does not consider the changes between different security
level nodes. Moreover, current model does not simulate the detailed situations
including several broken paths. It rather considers the ad hoc network under an ideal
running condition.
6.2 Future Research
There are several ways in which this work could be extended in the future. Some
important and promising directions are listed as follows:
1) The practicability and security of ad hoc networks is still under research. No routing
protocol can outperform all the others. Ad hoc network is most likely to be applied to
some specific fields, for example, battlefield. Under such situation, the security issue
is more important than wired network and should be stressed. Some results in SOR
are based on the result of simulation. The theoretical solution of the relationship
between maximum security and proportion of different security level nodes requires
further research. Quality of service in multipath routing is also worthy for more
investigation.
2) The proposed SPN model is an analytical model. It approximates and generates a
proper amount of traffic going through one node in a network of a particular size.
Colored Petri Nets should be developed to represent a more detailed model. However,
because of the limitation of Petri nets, it is difficult to simulate a large number of
mobile nodes in Petri nets model, like what was did in ns2. Hence, using a analytical
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model to analyze the network performance is a feasible research issue based on the
advantage of Petri nets.
3) Erlang distributions with a given mean can be applied in the Petri net model to
approximate the constant distribution. That will increase the computational
complexity but can improve the proposed model with better practicability.
4) The manner of attack by enemy has been described in Chapter 2. How to quantify
these attacks needs future development. For example, how to distinguish between a
compromised node and a link-lost node is still undefined. If this node moves into a
linkable area, should we establish a new link to it or treat it as a compromised node
again? More security characteristics need to be quantified and clarified.
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